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Abstract 
Chaotic road traffic situation in most Nigerian and African cities and roads 
is a nightmare, and a significant proportion of the cost of goods and services 
is attributed to this. A general feature is that these problems are due to 
tyranny of small decisions by motorists and some other citizens, hence, traffic 
problems in Nigeria are analysed in the context of a social dilemma. Game 
theoretic models based on the famous prisoner/commons dilemma game were 
used for the analysis. The analysis revealed the mechanism and scientific 
basis for most traffic problems encountered in Nigeria. Finally, it is 
suggested that the undesirable equilibrium outcome of the social dilemma 
could be avoided by using mechanism design and structural changes to the 
social game to achieve the desired efficient outcome and by so doing 
increased productivity, reduced accidents, injuries and deaths, and the 
resultant increased economic growth will be achieved. 
Keywords: Game theory; Social Dilemma; Road Traffic; Equilibrium; 
Mechanism design 
Introduction  
Social dilemmas are situations in which private interests are at odds with 
collective interests. This is often referred to as the tyranny of small decisions. 
Such situations arise because people frequently attach more weight to their 
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short-term selfish interests than to the long-term interests of the group, 
organization, or society to which they belong. Many of the most challenging 
issues we face in the world, from the interpersonal to the inter-group, are at 
their core social dilemmas. Naturally human beings are self centred or 
selfish. Although the selfish behavioural tendencies of humans are rational, 
often it is not for the common good of the group, organization or society to 
which he belongs. For example, although payment of taxes is for the 
common good of the society, ordinarily a rational human being would want 
to evade taxes, even though he would like to enjoy public amenities like good 
roads, pipe borne water, electricity and other public utilities provided by the 
government. The public goods are non-excludable because whether you pay 
or you don’t pay taxes you still enjoy them. 
Social dilemmas describe situations in which the rational behaviour of an 
individual -defined in pure and simple economic terms - leads to sub-optimal 
outcomes from the collective standpoint (Dawes, 1980; Kollock, 1998). 
Researchers frequently use the experimental games method to study social 
dilemmas in the laboratory. Sometimes the experimental results differ from 
theoretical predictions (Carmichael, 2005). In fact in an experiment 
conducted on prisoner dilemma, players were found to cooperate half of the 
times (Camerer, 2003). An experimental game, which is often simulated with 
the computer, is a situation in which participants choose between cooperative 
and non-cooperative alternatives, yielding consequences or outcomes for 
themselves and others (opponents). These games are generally depicted with 
a pay-off matrix representing valuable outcomes for participants like money 
or lottery tickets. Social dilemmas are in fact a “conflict in which most 
beneficial action for an individual will, if chosen by most people, have a 
harmful effect on everyone” (Oliver, 1980; Marwell, 1988; Elster, 1989). 
There are three main aspects of social dilemma. They include: Tragedy of the 
commons, prisoner dilemma and public goods dilemma. The concept of 
social dilemma has been used to explain many phenomena in various facets 
of life. In 1982, the estuarine ecologist, William Odum, published a paper 
where he extended the notion of the tyranny of small decisions to 
environmental issues. According to Odum, "much of the current confusion 
and distress surrounding environmental issues can be traced to decisions that 
were never consciously made, but simply resulted from a series of small 
decisions” (Odum, 1982).     Other writers like Odum have applied the 
concept of social dilemma to problems in many spheres of life. This work is 
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the first attempt to apply this concept to traffic problems encountered in 
Nigeria and all over Africa. 
Most traffic problems in Nigerian cities are due to the tyranny of small 
decisions by motorists and citizens. Traffic problems results to the following: 
• Delayed delivery of goods and services. 
• Increased transportation costs. 
• Faster depreciation of vehicles. 
• Increased environmental pollution. 
• Psychological and mental problems etc. 
• Accidents. 
• Injuries and deaths. 
Traffic problems are non-excludable because whether you contribute to it or 
not you are affected by it in one way or the other. The general effect of these 
problems is that it affects the economy negatively. The negative effects stems 
from the fact that the rates of production and delivery of goods are reduced 
leading to slow rate of growth of the gross domestic products (GDP). Also, 
the cost of production and delivery of goods and services is increased which 
reduces the profitability of business enterprises with the attendant reduction 
in economic growth. In addition to these, accidents, deaths and injuries are of 
great cost to the economy. 
Transport and logistic is an important aspect of supply chain management. 
According to Stevenson (2002), American companies in 1993 spent $670 
billion-a gaping 10.5 percent of GDP-to wrap, bundle, unload, sort, reload, 
and transport goods. This is an eloquent testimony of the how much efficient 
transport and logistics could do to enhance economic growth. Traffic 
problem in Nigeria could make the cost go up even higher up to 20percent of 
the GDP.  
This paper examines the road traffic situation in Nigeria, establishes the 
general reasons for the road traffic problems which is most often due to 
tyranny of small decisions, and modelled the problem in the context of a 
social dilemma using game theoretic analysis. 
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Background 
Theoretical Background 
There are many theories used to analyse and understand the mechanisms and 
basis of social dilemmas. Such theories include: game theory, evolutionary 
theories and psychological theories. The basic theory used in studying social 
dilemma is the game theory. The psychological and evolutionary theories are 
used as a complementary and reinforcement to game theory. The 
psychological and evolutionary theories are used to explain why rational 
agents behave the way they do in social dilemma situations. 
Game theory is the study of interaction between rational players where the 
outcomes depends on the choice of strategy of each player given the 
opponent’s strategies. Game theory is interested in optimising 
outcomes/payoffs for decision makers in strategic situations. There are many 
solution concepts in game theory which guides the decision taker in arriving 
at an outcome that maximizes his utility or at worst makes him better off. The 
most popular solution concept in non cooperative games is the Nash 
equilibrium (Nash, 1950). The Nash equilibrium solution concept will guide 
the prediction of players behaviour in social dilemma models developed in 
this work. 
Studying the circumstances or conditions under which people cooperate 
might lead to recommendations to solve social dilemmas in society. The 
literature distinguishes between three broad classes of solutions—
motivational, strategic, and structural—which vary in whether they see actors 
as motivated purely by self-interest (selfish behaviour) and in whether they 
change the rules of the social dilemma game.  
The structural solutions involve changing the structure of the game model 
used to capture the social dilemma situation. By so doing a new equilibrium 
point is obtained for the game, and the new equilibrium point will lead to a 
more efficient outcome. We shall explore the structural solution in all the 
discussion in this paper. 
The Nigerian Situation 
In Nigeria controlling road traffic is quite a challenge. Often motorists are 
faced with chaotic traffic situations. The traffic problems are usually caused 
by the defective behaviours of motorists, citizens, government officials and 
law enforcement agents. These defective behaviours include: 
1. Driving against the traffic. 
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2. Following illegal routes. 
3. Dropping/picking passengers at unauthorized points along the road. 
4. Abandoning broken down vehicles on the road. 
5. Buying goods from hawkers without clearing away from the road. 
6. Illegal parking of vehicles along the main road. 
7. Construction and use of illegal structures for businesses along the 
main road. 
8. Unrestricted use of private cars. 
9. Illegal check points mounted by the police and other law 
enforcement agents etc.  
Bad roads which constitute a substantial part of the Nigeria road network are 
equally a major contributory factor to road traffic problems and defective 
behaviours by motorists. The Nigerian situation is not different from what 
obtains in many parts of Africa and most developing countries. 
The Model 
The model used for the analysis is based on multi-person social dilemma 
(public goods/commons dilemma). The game matrix in figure 1 shows the 
common/public goods dilemma model that is used to analyse road traffic 
problems as a social dilemma.  
Here it is assumed that the motorists/citizens are not necessarily opposed to 
each other. All the actors/parties (groups of motorists/citizens) could either 
cooperate for the their common good or defect by engaging in activities that 
is beneficial to them but it is not in the best interest of all the motorists and 
makes the traffic situation worse off in the long run, while making 
themselves temporarily better off. This model is suitable for modelling most 
traffic problems in Nigeria. 
Looking at the game matrix in fig. 1, from game theoretic predictions, the 
equilibrium point is at point D, D. Defective behaviour is the dominant 
strategy for both players, hence, the game theoretic prediction is that both 
players would defect. This is a commons dilemma for both parties as they 
could get better payoffs by cooperating. Hence, it is in the best interest of 
both parties to cooperate. If both cooperate, each group of motorists gets a 
payoff of 100. If both defect, each group of motorists gets a payoff of 30. 
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Non excludability implies that if there is defective behaviour, defection 
continues as long as the traffic continues to move. If both parties want to 
maximize their payoffs, their dominant strategy is to engage in defective 
behaviours. In the long term this often leads to traffic deadlock or near 
deadlock situations. These deadlock situations are a frequent feature of traffic 
situations in Nigeria of which the author has been trapped in it several times. 
The game above is symmetric because it is assumed that the two groups of 
motorists get the same payoff. Since the game is symmetric, the generalized 
payoff structure is shown in fig. 2. 
Government officials and political office holders often flout traffic 
regulations in Nigeria and many African countries. In this situation, the 
traffic dilemma becomes asymmetric as shown in fig. 3. 
The defective behaviour by one group of motorists/citizens constitutes a 
trigger strategy and the grim outcome of such a strategy is for the cooperating 
party to defect forever. The theoretical prediction is supported by my 
observation of what happens in practice. In many traffic problems that I 
noticed throughout Nigeria, I found out that once a group of 
motorists/citizens engages in defective behaviours, the cooperating groups 
most of the time respond by starting their own defective behaviour. This is 
akin to tit for tat behaviour in prisoner dilemma. The outcome of such grim 
strategy is usually traffic deadlock or near deadlock situations. This model is 
characteristic of many traffic problems in Nigeria some of which I have 
earlier mentioned. 
Finite Repetition 
Finite repetition occurs when the cause of the traffic build up is expected to 
last for a definite time period. For example it could last few or several days. 
The cause of the build up could be: broken down vehicle expected to be 
taken off the road within days, bad portions of the road which are expected to 
be repaired within days etc. in this scenario, motorists expect to meet the 
same situation for a definite/finite number of times. 
If the game in fig. 1 is repeated a finite number of times, and assuming a 
stage game G, where G (T) is played T times; in this case we assume the 
game is repeated two times. According to the theory of finitely repeated 
games (Gibbons, 1992), the payoff structure for the game could be 
represented by a single payoff matrix representing the possible payoff from 
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the two stages, which is the sum of the payoff from each stage other than the 
first stage added to the original payoff matrix. In this case we assume the 
payoffs for the parties in each stage is 30, 30. Hence, the payoff structure in 
fig. 4. 
Looking at the game matrix in fig. 3, from game theoretic predictions, the 
equilibrium point is at point D, D. Defective behaviour is the dominant 
strategy for both players, hence, the game theoretic prediction is that both 
players would defect.  
The Nash equilibrium of the one short game in fig. 1 is the same as the Nash 
equilibrium of the two stage game in fig. 3. This corroborates the following 
folk theorem for finitely repeated games: “A finitely repeated game has a 
unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium which corresponds to the Nash 
equilibrium of the one short on which the repetition is based”. 
The implication of this is that if the traffic situation occurs in finite number 
of times. Defective behaviours would still be the dominant strategy. This fact 
is consistent with my observation of the traffic problems in Nigeria. 
Infinite/indefinite Repetition 
Indefinite repetition occurs when the cause of the traffic build up is expected 
to last indefinitely. The cause of the build up could be: bad portions of the 
road which are not expected to be repaired anytime soon, illegal structures 
along the main road, perennial illegal parking of vehicles etc. In this scenario, 
motorists expect to meet the same situation indefinitely. 
If either or both group of motorists engages in cooperative behaviours and 
the game repeated indefinitely/infinitely, capturing the situation 
mathematically as a repeated prisoner dilemma repeated indefinitely we 
have: 

















       P Is the probability that the game continues. 
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       coopEPO Is the expected payoff from cooperation. 
If some group of motorists/citizens engages in cooperative behaviour and the 
other group engages in defective behaviours, the cooperating group might 
retaliate by defecting. This TIT for TAT behaviour results to deadlock or 
near deadlock situation. Capturing the situation mathematically as a repeated 
prisoner dilemma repeated indefinitely we have: 























       
defect
EPO   Is the expected payoff from defection. 
Since a reasonable decision rule for the players would be to cooperate if 
defect
EPOcoopEPO > or: 










Rearranging (3) leads to: 







The derivation above is a proof of the Friedman’s theorem which states that 
“for any prisoner dilemma where the equilibrium payoff is d where d<a, if 
the discount factor is sufficiently high or close to 1 there exists a sub game 
perfect equilibrium where the payoff is equal to a” (Gibbons, 1992).  
At critical value of the probability denoted by *P  we have: 
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If there are severe penalties for traffic offenders or in situations where the 
numbers of bad roads, illegal parking of vehicles, illegal structures along the 
road etc, which often cause traffic problems, are greatly reduced, the value of 
the critical value of probability *P  will be low so that the probability of 
cooperative behaviours is high. We shall discuss this in detail in the next 
section. 
Results and Discussion 
It is been shown that traffic problems in Nigerian cities could be modelled 
and analysed in the context of social dilemma. Small decisions, taken by 
motorists and citizens, which though rational do not take into account the 
overall interest of the all motorists and other citizens. Consequently, over 
time the road traffic reaches a deadlock or near deadlock situation. 
One big question therefore arises. How can this disastrous outcome be 
avoided? As I have mentioned earlier, one method of solving the problem of 
social dilemma is through structural change to the underlying game. A very 
good structural solution approach which could be used to solve social 
dilemma problems is the adoption of mechanism design. Mechanism design 
is increasingly being used by social choice planners to obtain desirable 
outcomes that would improve social welfare. In this context using 
mechanism design, the principal (government regulator), would design a 
mechanism which would make it in the best interest of the players to 
cooperate and hence a most efficient outcome is obtained. 
One method of changing the structure of this social dilemma game is by 
punishing severely defective behaviours which motivates motorists/citizens 
to cooperate. A regulator such as government could be used to achieve this. 
This scenario changes the game structure to a non commons dilemma as 
shown in fig. 5.  
As shown in fig. 5, the dominant strategy equilibrium point is (C, C). Hence, 
it is favourable to both parties to cooperate. 
In furtherance of our discussion on structural changes to games, consider the 
game matrix in fig. 6. 
The change of  *P from 0.5 in fig. 6 to 0.333 in fig. 7 means that if the game 
structure in is changed to the structure in fig. 7, it is easier to achieve 
cooperation among the parties in fig. 7 if the game is repeated indefinitely. 
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One way to achieve is to put measures in place which would minimize 
drastically the possibility of traffic build up hence, reducing the incentive to 
defect. Such measures include: destruction of illegal structures along the 
road, dismantling illegal check points, prompt removal of broken down 
vehicles, prompt fixing of bad portion of road etc. Punishing motorists that 
leave their broken vehicles on the road would help in prompt removal of 
broken down vehicles. Making officials responsible for road maintenance 
leave up promptly to their responsibilities would drastically reduce number 
of un-repaired failed portions of the road. 
In continuation, other measures that could change the game structure include: 
building of strong good roads and elimination of illegal parking of vehicles 
which reduce the possibility of traffic build up. This motivates motorists to 
engage in cooperative behaviours. This is because good roads and 
elimination of illegal parking of vehicles reduce the marginal payoffs to 
defective behaviours in traffic situations. 
Similarly, improving public transportation system by making it attractive to 
middle class and upper middle class commuters would reduce the use of 
private cars as a means of transportation to workplaces. This is because the 
incentive of using them would be reduced under the circumstance. 
In the same vein, provision of good parking spaces in cities will discourage 
illegal parking of vehicles along roads and alley ways thereby motivating 
motorists to engage in cooperative behaviours. 
Furthermore, the Nigerian government should as a matter of urgency 
eliminate/remove all illegal check points where law enforcement agents 
extort money from motorists. These check points often cause traffic 
problems, accidents, injuries and deaths. Check points on the highway should 
be mounted only where it is absolutely necessary to do so. The law 
enforcement agents should engage more in patrols instead of mounting illegal 
checkpoints under the pretext of fighting and controlling crime when in 
actual fact the real purpose is to extort money from the public.  
From my observation, indefinite cooperative behaviours are prevalent in 
government reservation areas and low density areas. Features of these areas 
include good urban plan, good parking spaces, big roads, absence of illegal 
structures, absence of illegal check points etc. These features make the 
incentive to defect very low and cooperation is achieved indefinitely as 
predicted by game theory. These areas constitute a very tiny percentage of 
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the whole motorable area. As a matter of fact, generally, good urban planning 
seen in government reservation areas and low density areas encourages 
cooperative behaviour by motorists and reduces road traffic problems. 
In continuation of our analysis, assuming the asymmetric payoff structure in 
the game matrix in fig. 3 is as shown in fig. 8. 
The implication of this is that it is easier for the citizens to cooperate than 
government officials and political office holders if the game is repeated 
indefinitely. This explains why government officials and political office 
holders are often very reluctant to address the issue of perennial traffic 
problems in Nigeria and other African countries. 
Conclusions 
The analysis in this work has revealed the scientific basis for most traffic 
problems in Nigeria. It has shown why politicians and government officials 
are often aloof to the traffic problems in Nigeria. The first step towards 
solving the traffic problem in Nigeria is that the government officials and 
politicians must obey traffic regulations completely and stop bullying other 
motorists. Government being the regulator should lead by example. 
The decisions we make today determines our future well being. A deep 
understanding of the science of decision making and human judgment, if 
harnessed properly, will enable us make better decisions for the collective 
good of the society. Traffic problems affect economic growth and societal 
well being. If traffic is not properly managed economic growth is hampered 
and poverty increases. It is therefore in the best interest of individuals and 
government that chaotic traffic situations are avoided as much as possible all 
over Nigeria and Africa in general so that the country and the continent 
continue to thrive and prosper indefinitely. The game theoretic analysis done 
in this work has given us an insight into scientific reasons for persistent 
traffic problems in Nigeria and many parts of Africa.  
Armed with the analytical tools used in this work traffic problems could be 
controlled by employing appropriate control mechanisms and problem 
solutions recommended in this work. 
The analysis done in this work will be very useful to game theorists, 
engineers, economists, management scientists, psychologists and sociologists 
who are actively involved in the science of decision making and its 
consequences on the society. 
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Fig. 1 Traffic Situation as Commons Dilemma 
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Fig. 2 Commons Dilemma with Symmetric payoff structure 
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Fig. 3 Commons Dilemma with Asymmetric payoff 
structure 
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Fig. 8 Asymmetric Traffic Dilemma 
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